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Central Asia is increasingly the focus of intense international attention because of its 
geopolitical and economic importance as well as its unsettled transition processes. 
Central Asian countries, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan,  faced  enormous  challenges  when  the  Soviet  Union  disintegrated. 
Overall,  they  have  made  rudimentary  progress  in  opening  up  to  the  international 
community,  creating  market  institutions,  and  building  more  inclusive,  democratic 
political processes. Daunting challenges remain  reflected in the region‟s relatively 
low  economic  and  human  development  indicators.  While  reforms  to  stabilize, 
liberalize and privatize the economy have  been conducted in all countries except 
Turkmenistan, reforms of the institutional environment have been largely neglected. It 
is evident that the lack of effective institution building as well as rule enforcement in 
the  economic  and  political  realms  represents  one  of  the  key  weaknesses  and 
drawbacks of transition. Hence, crafting adequate market institutions will be of utmost 
importance  in  the  years  ahead.  Due  to  similar  political  side  conditions,  high-
performing China is taken as a model of orientation for Central Asian countries in this 
essay; the more so as most governments in the region have recently begun to place 
a stronger emphasis on improving relations with China. The paper is structured as 
follows:  The  next  section  addresses  the  need  to  craft  a  politico-institutional 
foundation of economic transition policies from a theoretical perspective. Section 3 
elaborates on Chinese economic transition as a reference model for Central Asian 
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Central Asia is increasingly the focus of intense international attention because of its 
geopolitical and economic importance as well as its unsettled transition processes. 
Central Asian countries, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan,  faced  enormous  challenges  when  the  Soviet  Union  disintegrated. 
Overall,  they  have  made  rudimentary  progress  in  opening  up  to  the  international 
community,  creating  market  institutions,  and  building  more  inclusive,  democratic 
political processes. Daunting challenges remain  reflected in the region‟s relatively 
low economic and human development indicators (UNDP 2005). While reforms  to 
stabilize, liberalize and privatize the economy have been conducted in all countries 
except  Turkmenistan,  reforms  of  the  institutional  environment  have  been  largely 
neglected. It is evident that the lack of effective institution building as well as rule 
enforcement  in  the  economic  and  political  realms  represents  one  of  the  key 
weaknesses  and  drawbacks  of  transition.  Hence,  crafting  adequate  market 
institutions will be of utmost importance in the years ahead (Zeitler 2005). 
  Due to the institutional weaknesses documented in the literature, reported by 
local and foreign business elites, and analyzed by international organizations such as 
the  World  Bank,  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  or  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development, the objective of this paper is to elaborate the need 
for a secure politico-institutional foundation of economic transition and to explore a 
way of how to achieve such a foundation for the Central Asian countries. Since these 
countries show many differences in terms of initial conditions to transition, resource 
endowments,  financial  constraints,  and  political  preferences,  no  how-to-manual or 
best-practice approach can be expected. What can be done, however, is to identify 
broad  principles  which  may  be  appropriate  to  guide  institution  building  and 
policymaking within the given politico-institutional environment. In this context, not 
                                                 
1 This paper has been written within the project “Emerging Market Economies in Central Asia: The Role of 
Institutional Complementarities in Reform Processes”; financial support by the VolkswagenFoundation is greatly 
acknowledged.   3 
only  economic  efficiency  is  of  importance.  Particularly,  political  feasibility,  i.e., 
measures  which  are  in  the  interest  of  the  ruling  elites,  is  the  key  to  successful 
economic  reform  and  development.  Due  to  similar  political  side  conditions,  high-
performing China is taken as a model of orientation for Central Asian countries in this 
essay; the more so as most governments in the region have recently begun to place 
a stronger emphasis on improving relations with China. 
  The paper is structured as follows: The next section addresses the need to 
craft  a  politico-institutional  foundation  of  economic  transition  policies  from  a 
theoretical perspective. Section 3 elaborates on Chinese economic transition as a 
reference model for Central Asian countries. Conclusions follow in Section 4. 
 
 
2. The need for a politico-institutional foundation of economic transition 
The  analysis  of  institutions  has  substantially  improved  our  understanding  of  how 
economies  develop  through  time.
2  The process of development and transition is 
regarded as being largely determined by the evolution of institutional arrangements 
which determine the terms of exchange between different agents . Economic growth 
occurs if institutions provide relatively low transaction costs in impersonal markets, 
reduce potential hazards of production and trade, facilitate capital accumulation and 
capital  mobility,  allow  pricing  and  sharing  of  risks,  and  encoura ge  cooperation. 
Consequently,  differences  in  economic  performance  between  countries  do  not 
ultimately result from countries‟ natural or technological endowments. Eventually they 
result from the established economic and political order and the policies pursued by 
governments. The efficacy of both factors is crucially determined by underlying rules 
and constraints and particularly by the interplay of economic and political institutions. 
Institutions  are  conceived  as formal rules and  informal constraints  (including  their 
enforcement  characteristics)  which  provide  the  incentive  structure  for  indivudual 
behvior. Political institutions include those institutional arrangements which directly 
affect political decision-making processes in the course of economic development 
and transition. They, e.g., include rules that specify a polity‟s hierarchical structure, its 
elementary  decision  rules,  as  well  as  the  explicit  mechanisms  of  agenda  control. 
Therefore,  these  institutions  can  be  considered  as  devices  for  the  allocation  of 
                                                 
2 This section essentially draws from Ahrens (2002), Section 4.4.   4 
political power and positions and hence affect political leaders‟ capability of pursuing 
their preferences and achieving their goals.
3 
The  need  to  consider  the  importance  of  political  institutions  for  economic 
development, transition, and policy ref orm is clearly revealed by the problems of 
economic transformation and political transition in less developed and previously 
socialist countries. Frequently, advisors focusing on economic transition urgently 
request governments to get the prices right. Alt hough this is a critical issue of 
economic reforms, this advice is not sufficient to ensure a successful transformation. 
Many  governments  face  political  and  social  constraints  which  hinder  them  in 
implementing coherent market-oriented reforms. If, e.g., private interest groups have 
a strong influence on policy making, economic policies may show a significant bias 
favoring special interests, and do not benefit society as a whole. Even if governments 
initiate policy reform with a suitable policy mix based on  an adequately specified set 
of economic institutions, economic development may be impeded by political risks 
resulting  from  uncertainties  about  government  behavior  in  the  future.  As  the 
experiences with failed policy reforms in less developed countries (LD Cs) indicate, 
proper advice regarding the formation of policy reform needs to account for the 
relationship between the economy and the polity. Emerging markets require not 
merely  well-functioning  economic  institutions  such  as  private  property  rights,  a 
rational price system, and a well-defined law of contract. They also require a secure 
political foundation that allows the formation and implementation of economically and 
socially necessary reforms. 
However, institutions can neither be taken for granted nor  is institutional change 
guided by an invisible hand onto some beneficent path. Eventually, the emergence of 
adaptively  efficient  economic  institutions  crucially  depends  on  the  existence  of 
functioning political markets, because the polity specifies, implem ents, and enforces 
the formal rules of economic exchange. But political markets are usually neither 
perfectly competitive nor efficient. The ability of the state to promote institutional 
change that benefits the economy as a whole crucially depends on the  institutional 
structure of the polity. This is because different politico -institutional arrangements 
imply different political transaction costs and hence different incentives for policy 
makers. Political transaction costs affect the interaction between various branches of 
government and between political authorities, business elites, and other groups of 
                                                 
3  See North (1989) as well as the works of Dixit (1996), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Krehbiel (1991), 
McNollgast (1989), and North (1990b).   5 
society.  Ultimately  they  determine  political  choices.  Consequently,  economic 
outcomes are not only responses to market conditions, but also the products of these 
institutionalized relations (Dixit 1996; Evans 1995). 
Hence if initiating and facilitating institutional change by the state is a pivotal 
component of policy reform and an indispensable condition for its success, we need 
to recognize that this is only one side of the coin. The flip side is the need to make 
the state effective in implementing and enforcing institutional and other policies. This 
requires  a  thorough  analysis  of,  and  a  differentiated  conceptual  approach  to,  the 
state apparatus which avoids an oversimplified treatment of the state as a monolithic 
entity. Max Weber (1972/1921) defined the state as a compulsory association that 
successfully  claims  the  monopoly  of  the  legitimate  use  of  physical  force  within  a 
specific community. Contemporary scholars usually view the state in the Weberian 
tradition, but attempt to usefully amend this definition by reducing the complexity of 
analysing what states do and what roles they perform. Also note that the capability of 
state  actors  in  achieving  objectives  such  as  internal  and  external  security,  and 
effective  revenue  collection,  or  in  asserting  control  and  autonomy  is  strongly 
influenced  by  the  degree  of  social  mobilization,  economic  conditions,  and  by  the 
state‟s internal cohesion and legitimacy. In addition, the pursuit of public interests 
may  conflict  with  the  private  interests  of  individual  policy  makers  and  contention 
along the boundaries of the state often results from, or is closely linked to, disputes 
between different levels and branches of government, public agencies as well as 
diverse interests of bureaucrats. 
The definition of the state, used in this essay, essentially follows those outlined in 
Evans  et  al.  (1985)  and  Grindle  (1996).  Thus  the  state  is  seen  as  a  nexus  of 
institutions  for  social  control,  authoritative  policy  formation  and  implementation,  in 
which policy makers and social actors interact with each other and influence the path 
of economic, social, and political development, which in turn shapes the behavior of 
individuals and groups. In general, state institutions help to mediate conflicting social 
demands  and  produce  specific  policies  and  rules  that  govern  social  interactions 
within and beyond the political realm. One central purpose of state institutions is to 
reduce  uncertainty  about  political  change.  This,  first  of  all,  concerns  government 
changes. Institutional arrangements defining mechanisms for government selection 
significantly  shape  expectations  about  who  may  assume  power  and  what  kind  of 
institutional reforms may be expected. Secondly, political change may be associated   6 
with  fundamental  changes  in  the  structural  foundation  of  a  polity.  This  refers  to 
changes in both the general rules that guide political interaction and the rules that 
govern the evolution of the polity over time. Institutions governing this type of political 
change, especially  a  country‟s constitution,  are  essential because  they  shape  the 
strategies  which  interest  groups  and  individuals  pursue  to  advance  their  political 
objectives in the future. 
Since the state itself can be perceived as a complex nexus of institutions, which 
provide the incentive structure for policy makers and determine the process of policy 
formulation,  implementation,  and  enforcement,  institution  building  as  a  key 
component of policy reform has two dimensions: (1) creating the formal economic 
institutions which guide private sector development and coordination; and (2) crafting 
political institutions which are conducive to the proper and sound implementation and 
enforcement of economic institutions and policies. 
However, the task relating to this second dimension is subject to what Weingast 
(1993 and 1995) calls “the fundamental political dilemma of an economic system”; 
namely that a strong government, which is required to protect and enforce property 
rights, is also able to violate these and other citizens‟ rights and to confiscate private 
wealth,  thereby  creating  disincentives  for  private  actors  to  carry  out  long-term 
investment  and  to  provide  information.  This,  in  turn,  blocks  thriving  markets,  and 
eventually halts development. As North (1990a: 59) puts it bluntly, “if the state has 
coercive force, then those who run the state will use that force in their own interest at 
the  expense  of  the  rest  of  society”.  This  is  why  a  secure  politico-institutional 
foundation  limiting  the  state‟s  ability  to  transgress  the  rights  of  private  actors  is 
indispensable  for  the  emergence  of  a  functioning  market  economy  and  for  its 
preservation. As Weingast (1993) observes, the absence of a political foundation of 
policy reform can lead to an equilibrium trap that is characterized by reform failure 
despite  the  choice  of  adequate  economic  policies.  Such  a  trap  may  result  from 
government failure to guarantee publicly that it actually will implement the announced 
reforms and stick to them beyond the short term. McKinnon (1991) argues that an 
equilibrium trap may be particularly likely if governments face (unexpected) financial 
difficulties and if the pressure for quick solutions is relatively high. Then governments 
will be more likely inclined to intervene in economic processes in order to increase 
net  revenues.  Since  private  investors  may  anticipate  government  intervention,   7 
uncertainty  with  respect  to  economic  policies  will  generate  political  risk  and  thus 
impede long-term economic performance. 
More generally, politicians, who reflect multiple interest groups, cannot succeed 
acting  alone,  but  need  to  strike  bargains  about  rules  and  rights  with  other  policy 
makers, business elites, and social groups with different interests. For example, in 
order  to  facilitate  private-sector  coordination  and  to  foster  economic  growth, 
politicians and bureaucrats have to rely on the private sector, which is expected to 
provide reliable information and to increase private investment. Since future payoffs 
of  alternative  political  choices,  however,  are  uncertain  ex  ante,  policies  can  be 
effectively  implemented  today  only  if  agreements  are  made  that  guide  future 
decisions. In order to reduce the costs of political bargaining, legislative exchange, 
and  policy  implementation,  institutional  arrangements  must  be  put  in  place  which 
facilitate the exchange over both time and space. They need to constitute ex ante 
agreements concerning the cooperation among different policy makers and between 
them and private business as well as important groups of society (North 1990a). But 
studies on institutions and transaction costs stress the fact that, while organizations 
and  individuals  have  numerous  incentives  to  strike  bargains,  compliance  to 
agreements ex post is often a critical problem (North and Weingast 1989). Of course, 
this kind of problem can be principally overcome by building up a good reputation. 
Yet  it  is well  known  that  there are  many  circumstances  in  which  this mechanism 
alone is insufficient to prevent non-compliance. 
The preceding  arguments  indicate  that  economic  institutions  and  policies that 
can be readily revised by policy makers have significantly different implications for 
economic performance than the same rules and policies when they are not subject to 
revision or when a revision is associated with high transaction costs. Therefore, for 
sustained economic development to occur, political institutions must be established 
that effectively bind political authorities to adhere to prior agreements and to use their 
powers in the public interest. This problem essentially comes down to the question of 
how credible commitments on the part of policy makers can be realized in order to 
help to overcome time inconsistent behavior and hence the potentially harmful effects 
of political discretion, opportunism, and arbitrariness. The argument to be elaborated 
here is that political institutions may provide the means which are suitable to make 
commitments credible.   8 
As Shepsle (1991: 247; italics original) defines it, “a commitment is a promise, 
pledge,  vow,  covenant,  guarantee,  or  bond  to  perform  in  a  specified  fashion.  A 
commitment is credible in either of two senses – the motivational and the imperative, 
respectively.” A commitment is said to be motivationally credible if it is self-enforcing 
in the sense that the respective party still wants to honor its commitment at the point 
in time when it is to be performed. More important in the realm of policy making, 
however,  is  commitment  in  the  imperative  sense.  This  means  that  the  respective 
party “is unable to act otherwise [at the time of performance; J.A.], whether he or she 
wants to or not; in this sense a commitment is credible, not because it is compatible 
with contemporaneous preferences but rather because performance is coerced or 
discretion to do otherwise is disabled” (ibid.). Since policy makers usually possess 
varying  degrees  of  discretionary  authority  and  are  often  not  believed  to  be 
motivationally  credible,  they  cannot  credibly  deny  that  they  will  behave 
opportunistically ex post even if such a denial would be truthful. They are credible 
only if they are willing and able to tie their own hands. Hence the necessity for policy 
makers  credibly  to  commit  themselves  to  policy  reforms  in  the  imperative  sense 
underlines the importance of political institutions. 
Disabling  political  discretion  requires  institutionalizing  an  asymmetry,  that  is, 
making it relatively easy to initiate new policies or to make agreements and making 
non-compliance relatively difficult. This can be achieved by the division of political 
labor.  Various  institutional  arrangements  can  enhance  the  credibility  of  reform 
policies. These include, e.g., constitutional provisions and imperatives that prohibit 
the  expropriation  of  private  property;  an  independent  judiciary;  independent 
regulatory  agencies;  as  well  as  the  empowerment  of  veto  groups  that  may  force 
unanimity between different political bodies such as the executive and the legislative 
branch  of  government.  Similarly,  institutional  procedures  may  reinforce  political 
structures and enhance the credibility and durability of decisions and policies. For 
example,  procedural  arrangements  such  as  mandatory  delays,  which  prescribe 
several deliberations before a status quo can be changed, raise the transaction costs 
of policy making and help to disable political discretion. 
So far the  question of  how  to  make  political commitments  credible  has  been 
discussed with particular respect to the durability and sustainability of public policies. 
But there is more to it as Lupia and McCubbins (1998a and 1998b) observe. Starting 
from the premise that a credible government commitment is not necessarily based on   9 
reputation, ideologies, partisanships, individual backgrounds, or repeated play, they 
find that political credibility results from three conditions, the satisfaction of which is 
significantly  facilitated  by  specific  institutional  foundations.  These  determinants 
include the sincerity (or truthful revelation) condition, the capability condition, and the 
sustainability condition. All three components are necessary conditions for credible 
political commitments. First, recall that actions speak louder than words. Even if a 
government is able to implement reform policies, a lack of sincerity or truthfulness of 
political  decision  makers  who  support  reforms  by  words,  but  not  by  deeds,  is 
sufficient to ensure reform failure. Secondly, even if policy makers truthfully reveal 
what  they  actually  mean,  reforms  will  be  doomed  to  fail  and  promises  will  be 
regarded  as  non-credible,  if  the  government  lacks  the  capability  of  technical 
implementation  and  of  forming  appropriate  legislative  and  enforcement  coalitions. 
Third, even if pivotal political actors are sincere and capable, policy reforms will fail if 
they  cannot  be  sustained  over  time  in  the  course  of  government  changes  or 
exogenous shocks. This implies that the three conditions are individually necessary 
and collectively sufficient to make political commitments believable. 
Specific institutional arrangements, within which a pivotal political actor makes 
promises  to  the  citizenry  or  a  policy  statement  in  negotiations  with  international 
organizations,  can  serve  as  substitutes  for his  personal  attributes  with  respect  to 
sincerity.  An  appropriate  institutional  context  needs  to  increase  opportunity  and 
transaction  costs  for  breaking,  revising,  or  reneging  on  promises  (for  example, 
through  bonding  or  signaling  mechanisms).  Furthermore,  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
capability condition, specific institutions are required to ensure technical capability of 
implementing reforms (e.g., a competent and meritocratic public administration and 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative law setting the terms of delegation) and 
to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  a  legislative  and  enforcement  coalition  (e.g., 
appropriate  agenda  control  mechanisms  and  institutional  arrangements  for  the 
creation  of  ministerial  positions  and  committees).  Finally,  in  order  to  ensure  the 
sustainability  of  reforms,  institutions  need to  be  in place  which  can  protect  policy 
reform beyond the enacting government‟s or political leader‟s stint of power (e.g., 
veto gates in the governmental process and deliberation councils). 
There is a broad consensus in the New Institutional Economics literature that a 
credible  government  commitment  is  a  necessary  condition  for  successful  policy 
reform. In addition, it is widely agreed that suitably designed institutional features   10 
(which complement reputation-building) can impose effective restrictions on the ex-
post behavior of policy makers and are primary devices to enhance the ability of 
governments  to  stick  to  their  bargains  and  to  deliver  their  promises  to  citizens.
4 
Political institutions, in particular a country‟s constitution, play a critical role because 
they  primarily  determine  the  incentives  of  political  actors  and  hence  political 
outcomes in the form of economic rules and regulations and policies. 
Two qualifiers to the credibility-enhancing effects of political institutions, however, 
are to be taken into consideration. First of all, whether a society is driven by the rule-
of-law  depends  not  only  on  its  political  institutions.  Since  constitutions,  laws,  and 
regulations can be politically ignored, altered, or removed, mechanisms must be put 
in place which allow for the policing of deviations by governments. Weingast‟s (1993 
and  1995)  analyses  suggest  that  the  effectiveness  and  maintenance  of  political 
institutions  defining  the  legitimate  boundaries  of  the  state  crucially  depend  on  a 
consensus among citizens about the limits of government. This consensus, in turn, 
depends on the interaction of informal (opinions and attitudes of citizens) and formal 
institutions.  In  order  to  create  a  societal  consensus  during  the  development  or 
transformation  process,  promoting  the  emergence  of  a  civil  society  is  of  utmost 
importance.  Formal  institutions  may  become  a  focal  point  to  help  coordinate  and 
align citizens‟ informal attitudes, so that (new) formal institutions of policy making and 
representation can be sustained. Thereafter, the constituency is better prepared to 
control government behavior and to react in concert against the government if it is 
perceived to transgress its legitimate boundaries. 
Secondly, enhanced credibility through asymmetric institutionalization may come 
with a cost in that it implies a loss of policy flexibility. If political institutions are in 
place that effectively bind policy makers‟ hands today and in the future, it will become 
increasingly difficult to revise the course of policy reform, if external circumstances or 
the preferences of the constituencies change over time. Cox and McCubbins (1997) 
persuasively argue that too many veto points, which are controlled by political actors 
with diverse interests, may imply state indecisiveness and political stalemate. 
These caveats imply that single institutional features alone, which help overcome 
credibility  and  incentive-compatibility  problems,  will  be  insufficient  to  ensure 
successful policy reform. Only a coherent and consistent set of political, economic, 
                                                 
4   See, e.g., North and Weingast (1989), North (1990a), Borner et al. (1995), Weingast (1995), World Bank 
(1995), and Lupia and McCubbins (1998a). With respect to the role of institutions for achieving credible 
commitment in the realm of macroeconomic policies see,e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1990).   11 
and social institutions including both formal rules and informal constraints will lay the 
structural  and  procedural  basis  that  is  appropriate  to  secure  thriving  markets,  to 
ensure policy adaptability, and to implement policy reforms effectively. This finding 
indicates  the  need  for  an  overall  governance  structure  as  a  politico-institutional 
foundation of economic and social development. Hence, in important respects the 
logic  behind  political  organization  shows  significant  parallels  to  that  underlying 
economic organization. Regarding the latter, Williamson (1985: 48–9) recognizes that 
 
“Transactions  that  are  subject  to  ex  post  opportunism  will  benefit  if  appropriate 
safeguards  can  be  devised  ex  ante.  Rather  than  reply  to  opportunism  in  kind, 
therefore, the wise (…) [bargaining party; J.A.] is one who seeks both to give and to 
receive  „credible  commitments.‟  Incentives  may  be  realigned,  and/or  superior 
governance structures within which to organize transactions may be devised.” 
 
When  institutions  and  economic  policy  are  seen  as  the  focal  points  of  the 
development problem, attention needs to focus on questions such as (1) what are the 
integral  components  of  a  politico-institutional  foundation  of  policy  reform;  and  (2) 
which  conditions  will  be  conducive  to  the  emergence  of  an  effective  governance 
structure. The ramifications of the preceding arguments for Central Asian countries 




3.  The unorthodox institutional foundation of economic transition in China 
The notion of an institutional shock therapy has not played any role in the transition 
and development processes in East Asia, where economic transition has taken place 
in an authoritarian setting. In the 1960s and 1970, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia showed remarkable and sustained economic growth rates in 
non-democratic  settings.  In  China,  Vietnam,  and  Laos,  the  communist  party  has 
enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  power  and  has  not  been  willing  to  give  up  or  share  the 
political  leadership  with  other  political  forces.  Nevertheless,  most  governments 
started genuine market-oriented reforms making East Asia the economically fastest 
growing region over the past forty years. Recognizing that political power can be only 
maintained in the course of time if sustained economic growth is achieved which   12 
benefits  not  only  the  political  elite  and  big  business  but  all  strata  of  society, 
marketization  and  economic  growth  have  become  key  policy  objectives  to  gain 
political legitimacy. Authorities in all of these countries managed to credibly commit to 
market reforms, to establish incentives for productivity enhancing activties, and to 
enhance  the  incentive  compatility  of  policy  makers‟s  interests  and  the  needs  for 
sustained economic performance.
5 
Today, a common understanding holds that no blueprint exists regarding the 
design,  the  evolution,  or  the  components  of  a  market -enhancing  governance 
structure  (MEGS),  which  implies  a  secure  and  sustainable  politico -institutional 
foundation for economic transition and development. A governance structure to be 
effective and societally accepted needs to account for country-specific characteristics 
(Rodrik 2007). And yet, many studies indicate that broad principles exist, which may 
guide  policymakers,  advisors,  and   academics  though  the  complicated  terrain  of 
institution building: Besides the need for a strong but limited state and building 
market-oriented  capacity  in  the  public  administration,  key  economic  institutions 
should  be  crafted  and  enforced  which  ensure  a  p roper  functioning  of  market 
processes and private foster sector coordination.
6 
According  to  Rodrik  (2007),  key  economic  institutions  relate  to  rules  for 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, rules of the legal, regulatory, 
educational, financial, and social infrastructure as well as institutions for conflict 
management.  These  institutions  leave  room  for  considerable  interpretation  and 
adaptation. In Rodrik‟s (2007: 6) words: 
“first-order  economic  principles  (…)  do  not  map  into  unique  policy  packages. 
Reformers have substantial room for creatively packaging these principles into 
institutional designs that are sensitive to local opportunities and constraints.” 
In  particular,  the  high-performing  countries  in  East  Asia  have  convincingly 
demonstrated  that  pragmatic  (not  first-best)  institutions  can  foster  sustained 
economic  growth  in  a  non-democratic  setting.  Examples  include  the  East  Asian 
tigers, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonisia, and more recently 
Vietnam  and  China.  These  cases  indicate  that  unorthodox  transitional  institutions 
may  turn  out  to  be  more  effective  than  presumably  best-practice  institutional 
                                                 
5   See Root (1996), Campos and Root (1996), and Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006). 
6   For an overview of these studies as well as an in -depth introduction into the concept of market -
enhancing governance structures, see Ahrens (2002).   13 
arrangements  in  a  period  of  economic  transition.  Especially  for  an  authoritarian 
regime, they could make market-oriented reforms a viable policy choice, because 
they help political authorities to maintain power and control and, in addition, open up 
ways to make political elites winners of reform. Finally, specific transitional institutions 
tailored to the needs, capacities, and capabilities in the respective countries could be 
much faster developed than best-practice institutions  the latter usually need a long 
period of time to be crafted and enforced, and in many underdeveloped autocratic 
transition economies (e.g., in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or Turkmenistan), there would be 
a  lack  of  human  capital  to  operate  them  (e.g.,  law  drafting  and  enforcement). 
Evidence shows that transitional institutions can serve as functional equivalents to 
first-best institutions, e.g., with respect to creating incentives for doing business, to 
introduce  competition,  or  to  establish  control  rights  over  the  means  of  production 
(Qian 2003). 
For example, Chinese special economic zones (SEZs) represent a transitional 
institution regarding a gradual external opening-up strategy in the sense that a free-
trade area or a customs union with third countries would be more efficient from a 
theoretical  viewpoint,  but  at  a  given  point  in  time  this  is  not  a  feasible  option. 
Therefore,  SEZs  serve  as  a  second-best  way  to  open  up  the  economy  and,  in 
addition, signal a government‟s commitment to market-oriented reform. This would be 
reinforced, e.g., through public infrastructure investment, low tax rates, and liberal 
institutions and market rules governing the SEZs (Khan 2002). 
With  respect  to  internal  economic  reforms,  transitional  institutions  may, 
incrementally but visibly, enhance a government‟s credibility. The starting point would 
be to create a strong state, i.e. to enable authorities to credibly pre-commit to market-
oriented reforms and to enforce new rules of the game. A key challenge is to shield 
policymaking  entities  such  as  the  economic  bureaucracy  and  key  government 
agencies from the influence of reform opponents. Thus, public administration reform 
and capacity building are essential to strengthen the state apparatus. This requires (i) 
strengthening economic policy formulation, coordination, and implementation, e.g., 
through a central economic planning board  possibly staffed with foreign experts; (ii) 
public  financial  management  reform;  and  (iii)  civil  service  reform.  In  addition,   14 
meritocratic  recruitment  and  promotion  standards  could  provide  bureaucrats  with 
long-term career rewards thereby reducing incentives for corrupt behavior.
7 
Since measures such as   performance-based employment policies, downsizing 
surplus  staff,  and  organizational  restructuring  are  central  to  improving  the 
implementation capacities of weak executing agencies, it is necessary to complement 
sector-level capacity building with measures that concern the public administration in 
its entirety.
8 Such an approach to public administration reform would not threaten the 
political regime per se. To be effective, however, institutional and organizational 
reforms usually have to be complemented by   human resource development, the 
more so as knowledge of market economics and modern management techniques is 
often absent in (less developed) transition economies. 
In advanced democratic market economies, state strength is usually limited and 
political credibility enhanced through a subtle system of checks and balances. This 
option, however, is not available in autocratic transition countries. In such a case, one 
(far from perfect but) feasible option is to limit the government through an external 
flanking  of  the  respective  country‟s  reform  and  international  integration  process. 
Gradually  opening  up  the  economy  and  increasing  its  exposure  to  foreign 
competition as well as membership in international organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) helped Chinese authorities to incrementally and credibly 
enhance reform commitment. In the longer run, the authoritarian, though possibly 
reform-minded government can seek to bind its own hands at least regarding specific 
policy realms (e.g., through establishing an independent central bank). 
Regarding  economic  reforms,  macroeconomic  stability  is  an  unalterable 
precondition.  This  presupposes  a  market-oriented  price  system  and  a  (possibly) 
independent  central  bank  as  well  as  prudent  fiscal  management  and  at  least  a 
rudimentary market-oriented tax system. However, as the Chinese example shows, a 
complete price liberalization could contradict the interests of the political leadership in 
distinct  country-specific  contexts.  The  same  holds  for  large-scale  privatization. 
Chinese and other East Asian experiences support the view that it may be more 
promising to legalize and foster already existing small-scale private transactions, e.g. 
on farmers markets, in the retail sector as well as in industry and in an emerging 
                                                 
7   See Root (1996), Campos and Root (1996), Ahrens (2002), and Ahrens and Mengeringhaus (2006) for 
in-depth analyses how specific institutions contributed to enhance governments’ capacities and capabilities in the 
high-performing Asian economies including China. 
8   See Ahrens (2002) for further elaboration regarding the following aspects.   15 
service sector. Promoting newly emerging small and medium sized enterprises and 
gradually  creating  a  labor-intensive  private  sector  in  a  bottom-up  manner  could 
reinforce a partial price liberalization, support supply-side reactions of the economy, 
and foster job creation. 
Chinese  reform  experiences  show  that  agricultural  reform  by  abolishing 
agricultural collectives and establishing a household responsibility system can yield 
substantial and quick productivity gains. This might increase confidence in market 
forces  and  strengthen  the  support  of  further  reforms  at  later  stages  (Lee  1997). 
Regarding  industrial  restucturing,  China  adopted  a  dual-track  approach  which 
allowed  to  maintain  parts  of  the  planned  economy  for  a  transition  period,  until  a 
possibly emerging private sector will have gained sufficient economic strength so that 
it can absorb surplus labor from heavy industry (Qian 2003). This approach helped to 
enhance  economic  efficiency  of  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs),  to  minimize 
opposition  to  economic  reforms  ex  ante  (due  to  temporarily  protected  status-quo 
rents) and to increase the opposition to reform reversal ex post (due to an increasing 
number of people benefiting from reforms) (Lau et al. 2001). In other countries, such 
an approach could make industrial reforms compatible with a prevailing, potentially 
market-skeptical political ideology. Furthermore, it would be consistent with a gradual 
strategy of opening up vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Last but not least, as long as no dominant private sector exists in the economy, 
growth-enhancing reforms need to be in the interest of regime officials at the central 
and  local level.  Only  if  these  actors can  preserve  their  power and  privileges  and 
become reform winners, economic transition will be politically feasible. Again China 
offers  an  example  of  how  to  deal  with  such  a  challenge:  Decentralized  public 
commercialization through the devolution of economic competencies and the creation 
of township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) with hard budget constraints helped to re-
align  incentives  of  local  policymakers  and  bureaucrats  and  made  them  residual 
claimants  of  market  processes.  Moreover,  the  experience  of  TVEs  suggests  that 
control  rights  may  be  established  and  can  foster entrepreneurial activities  even  if 
property  rights  are  not  clearly  defined  (Qian  and  Weingast  1997).  Thus  formal 
legislation  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  sufficient  condition  for  ensuring  effective 
control.  In  practice,  Rodrik  (1999)  concludes,  the  efficacy  of  control  rights  is 
contingent not only on legislation but also on enforcement as well as informal norms 
such as customs and tradition. In order to avoid a capture of local governments by   16 
possibly emerging local groups owning immobile factors of production such as land, 
the introduction of a household responsibility system should be complemented by a 
possibly more egalitarian distribution of land rights at the beginning of an economic 
reform process. 
In sum, China gradually improved the quality of its market-oriented governance 
structure.
9  This clearly strengthened the politico -institutional foundation of gradual 
economic transition fostering competition in the domestic markets and gradually 
exposing domestic companies to the competitive pressures of the world market, 
providing incentives for productive business transactions, and rewarding economic 
risk taking. Market-enhancing governance, Chinese -style, has neither followed a 
straightforward theoretical imperative nor has it yielded clear -cut lessons for other 
countries at  the  same  stage  of  e conomic  development  (see  Figure  1).  But  the 
Chinese case reinforces the view that institutions and governance matter. Basic 
principles such as accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency play a 
key role in China, too. Of course, these p rinciples are not realized as they are in 
advanced democratic Western economies. Accountability of the political leadership, 
e.g.,  can  hardly  be  observed  with  respect  to  citizens.  But  relatively  effective 
monitoring devices help to hold the public administ ration accountable vis-à-vis the 
central government, and the institution of market -preserving federalism (MPF) in 
combination with a comparatively autonomous economic bureaucracy contribute to 
enhance accountability and incentive-compatibility within the public sector as well as 
the participation of lower -level governments in economic policymaking. Moreover, 
policy choices faced by Chinese policymakers at the national as well as the regional 
level appear to be comparatively transparent and predictable. Sinc e it is in the 
interest of most, if not all, political actors concerned with economic policymaking to 
foster overall growth and development, due to the competitive character of the MPF 
system and due to the openness of the overall Chinese economy, private  economic 
actors tend to have relatively stable expectations regarding the course of economic 
policymaking in the short as well as the long run, although authorities still tend to 
intervene selectively particularly into processes of distinct branches of the  economy 
such as the financial sector (Ahrens and Mengeringhaus 2006). 
Furthermore, the political leadership managed to enhance its legitimacy and its 
credibility from the viewpoint of citizens through its distinct approach to economic 
                                                 
9   The following arguments are drawn from Ahrens (2007).   17 
restructuring.  The  introduction  of  market  forces,  initially  mainly  through  partial 
liberalization of agricultural and other goods markets and the establishment of the 
household  responsibility  system,  allowed  the  rural  population to gain  from market 
exchange. In addition, the  dual-track approach applied in the context of industrial 
restructuring introduced market elements, but also maintained (and gradually phased 
out) basic rules of central planning. The former provided incentives to use and benefit 
from the market, while the latter (at least temporary) helped to preserve rents for 
those who may be negatively affected by the shift towards a market system. Taken 
together, the household responsibility system and the dual-track approach provided a 
new kind of wealth sharing mechanism that helped to reduce the number of losers 
from market-oriented reforms. This, in turn, contributed to political stability and thus 




























Figure 1: Governance in China 
 
The Chinese experiences indicate that governance quality is a relative as well as a 
dynamic factor: It is relative because the quality needs to be assessed with respect to 
the country‟s stage of development and regarding the governance quality of other 
economies  which  may  compete  for  mobile  factors  of  production.  It  is  dynamic 
because  different  stages  of  economic  development,  varying  international 
environments, and  changing  political side  conditions may  render hitherto  effective 
governance structures obsolete and demand new institutional arrangements which 
are suitable to cope with these new challenges to policymaking. 
While  the  Chinese  governance  structure  has  performed  comparatively  well   18 
according  to  key  governance  dimensions,  the  transitional  institutions  such  as  the 
dual-track approach, SEZs, and TVEs, which constituted this governance structure, 
can hardly serve as the foundation for future development. Therefore, the way to 
sustainably improve the market-enhancing characteristics of the Chinese governance 
structure  in  a  globalizing  world  is  complicated  and  demanding.  Particularly,  the 
lacking  accountability  of  the  central  government,  the  still  weak  rule  of  law,  the 
vulnerable financial system, and the restructuring of the SOEs need to be addressed 




4.  Implications for Central Asian countries 
How to craft a market-enhancing governance structure that is suitable as a politico-
institutional  foundation  of  effective  economic  transition?  The  preceding 
considerations  showed  that  basic  elements  of  governance  structures  can  be 
manipulated or crafted by political means. However, policymakers, bureaucrats or 
other actors affecting the  design  of  a  governance  structure  can never completely 
anticipate all future contingencies. Furthermore, numerous actors affect governance 
structures, either through comprehensive reforms such as restructuring a country‟s 
system  of  health  insurance,  or  through  smaller  changes,  e.g.,  firm-specific  labor-
market regulation. Usually, it is extremely difficult to ensure proper coordination of all 
actors, sometimes actors may actually not be interested in cooperating at all. This 
implies that certain changes in a country‟s governance structure can be consciously 
planned,  but  that  the  governance  structure  as  a  whole  is  subject  to  evolutionary 
change.  It  also  follows  that  looking  for  best-practice  governance  or  transferring 
governance structures from one country to another will be doomed to fail; the more 
so as such a transfer could not account for existing cultural endowments and the 
stock of social capital. 
Even  in  successful  transformation  countries,  governance  structures  are  not 
perfect. But  in  each  case,  they  exhibit  key  characteristics  which  help  to enhance 
government  commitment  to  economic  growth  and  development.  In  all  those 
countries,  numerous  institutions  underlying  the  governance  structure  score 
comparatively  high  according  to  four  governance  dimensions:  accountability, 
participation, predictability, and transparency; either because countries such as the   19 
new member states of the European Union have sought to implement Western best-
practice institutions (which in their cases materialized) or, as in the case of China and 
other East Asian countries, because effective transitional institutions could be crafted 
which represented functional equivalents to orthodox market institutions. 
Building and impartially enforcing institutions are key tasks for governments. This 
holds  equally  for  introducing  and  enhancing  market  development  as  well  as  for 
preserving functioning markets through time. Therefore, state apparatuses need to 
be made effective in implementing market-oriented policies, enforcing market-order 
institutions, and promoting private sector coordination. 
However,  Weingast‟s  (1993)  “fundamental  political  dilemma  of  an  economic 
system” has not yet been overcome in any of the Central Asia countries. Especially, 
Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  and  Turkmenistan  possess  strong  governments,  which 
could basically protect property rights and enforce other market rules. Since none of 
these governments, however, is sufficiently limited in its powers, they would be also 
able to violate rights of private business and citizens. Even if political authorities do 
not  intend  to  transgresss  against  these  rights,  policymakers  cannot  credibly 
precommit to comply with the rules. This fact creates disincentives for domestic and 
foreign private actors to carry out long-term investment and to provide information. 
Eventually, this may block thriving markets and impede development. 
  In  order  to  get  a  broad,  though  comparative  impression  of  the  politico-
institutional situation in Central Asia, it may be telling to take the analyses of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and the World Bank into consideration.
10 The Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) examines 125 countries and ranks them according to two 
composite  indicators:  the  status  index  measuring  a  country‟s  state  of  transition 
towards a market economy and a democracy; the management index reflecting the 
governance  quality  of  decision  makers.  Figures  2    6  provide  a  comparative 
perspective  on  the  politico-economic  situation  in  Central  Asia.  While  Figure  2 
compares Kazakhstan (blue line), economically the most advanced country in  the 
region, with China (red line), Figures 3  6 compare Kazakhstan (blue line) with each 
other Central Asian country (red line).  
 
 
                                                 
10   The  Bertelsmann  Foundation  provides  information  on  the  development  of  political  and  economic 
transition in a  great variety  of countries. For  more information,  see  http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/11.0html?&L=1; the World Bank provides its Governance Indicators at http://www.govindicators.org   20 
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Figure 5: 




Transformation in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation (2009) 
 
 
      The  similarity  of the  portrays  of  Kazakhstan  and  China  is striking. While  both 
countries perform relatively poorly in terms of democratic transition
11, which does not 
come  as  a  surprise given  the  political  history  and  power constellations  in both 
countries, performance is much better as regards the achieved state of economic 
transition  attributing  Kaza khstan  the  second  rank  in  the  Commonwealth  of 
Independent States.
12 The management index shows intermediate scores for both 
countries suggesting that a lot of efficiency-enhancing potential exists concerning the 
                                                 
11   See the indicators stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and 
political and social integration. On a scale from 0 to 10, Kazakhstan scores 4.2; for explanation of how indicators 
are calculated, see Bertelsmann Foundation (2009). 
12   The  so-called  market-economy  status  comprises  indicators  such  as  socioeconomic  level,  market 
organization,  currency  and  price  stability,  private  property,  welfare  regime,  economic  performance,  and 
sustainablity. In a scale from 0 to 10, Kazakhstan scores 6.8.   22 
reform  determination  and  management  and  steering  capabilities  of  the  public 
sector.
13 A comparison of Kazakhstan with the other Central Asia countries reveals 
that  the  former  outperforms  the  others  in  virtually  every  respect;  except  for 
Kyrgyzstan with respect to the democracy status. Key backlogs app ear to exist in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan regarding these countries‟ cooperation with the outside 
world. This holds in terms of regional cooperation, but also concerning the effective 
use  of  external  support  and  acting  as  a  reliable  partner  to  third  countries  and 
international  organizations.  Similary,  these  countries  lag  behind  in  terms  of 
institutions for conflict management, political consensus finding and participation, as 
well as in terms of using public assets efficiently, fighting corruption, and coordinating 
reform policies (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009). Furthermore, Kazakhstan takes the 
regional lead in virtually all dimensions of economic transition and performance. This 
clearly  reflects  the  country‟s  progress  in  building  key  economic  institutions  which 
constitute a market economy and provide incentives for market exchange. 
  The  World  Bank  Governance  Indicators  (WBGI)  support  this  assessment 
(Figures 7  12). The World Bank (2009) defines governance as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority (…) is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
the  state  for  the  institutions  that  govern  economic  and  social  interactions  among 
them”. Governance is measured through expert surveys according to six dimensions: 
voice  and  accountability,  political  stability,  government  effectiveness,  regulatory 
quality, the rule the law, and control of corruption. Figures 7  12 depict the scores of 
all  Central  Asian  countries  plus  China,  Malaysia,  and  Singapore  as  comparator 








                                                 
13   The management index comprises indicators such as the steering capability, the resource efficiency, 
consensus building, and international cooperation as regards the public sector. Kazkhstan scores 4.7 on a scale 
from 0 to 10.   23 
Figures 7  12 
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Source: World Bank (2009) 
 
 
The three East Asian comparator countries had been selected because they have 
(so far) successfully managed economic transition in a non-democratic setting with 
active and often effective government intervention and guidance of economic reform 
processes.  All  countries  have  pursued  non-orthodox,  largely  independent 
development  strategies,  established a  very  competent  economic bureaucracy  and 
relatively effective government-business interfaces (Campos and Root 1996; Ahrens 
and Mengeringhaus 2006). In addition, these three countries represent economies at 
three different stages of economic development (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Central Asia and comparator countries: economic indicators; 2008 
Country  GDP/capita (PPP)*, 2008  EBRD liberalization index** 
Kazakhstan  11.563  3.04 
Kyrgyzstan  2.174  3.08 
Tajikistan  1984  2.50 
Turkmenistan  5.765  1.50 
Uzbekistan  2.606  2.21 
     
Comparator countries     
China  5.943  n.a. 
Malaysia  14.225  n.a. 
Singapore  51.649  n.a. 
 
Sources: IMF (2008), EBRD (2008), own calculations,  * PPP : purchasing power parities ; IMF estimates, ** 
EBRD Transition Indicators are based on experts‟ judgments and range from „1‟ (unreformed centrally planned 
economy) to 4.33 (institutional quality of a representative developed market economy). 
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While Central Asian countries are clearly lagging behind in all dimensions, particular 
observations appear to be noteworthy. The comparatively bad performance in terms 
of voice and accountability is no surprise given the authoritarian regime or limited 
democratic standards in all countries. While Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries follow the democratic model of the EU, it should be borne in mind that 
accountability  mechanisms  and  participatory  involvements  in  policymaking  are 
basically conceivable (at least to some extent) in non-democratic settings as well. 
This has been documented in the Chinese case, and it is supported by the data on 
Malaysia and Singapore. Therefore, all Central Asian countries need to seek for ways 
especially in the public management domain to find more inclusive and accountable 
ways of formulating and implementing policies. Experiences in China and other high-
performing  Asian  economies  show  feasible  ways:  deliberation  councils  which 
constitute a closer government-business interface, fostering business intermediaries, 
and  promoting  competition  can  help  to  make  progress  in  this  area  (Root  1996, 
Ahrens 2002). 
  Similarly, measures improving the rule of law and fighting corruption appear to 
be largely independent of the political regime. Even Singapore and Malaysia score 
relatively  high  in  these  domains.  In  terms  of  public  sector  management  and  the 
quality  of  policymaking  Kazakhstan  performs  relatively  well  given  its  stage  of 
economic development.  Huge  backlogs  appear for long-time  closed Turkmenistan 
and poor Tajikistan. 
  While  Kazakhstan  has  already  taken  important  steps  towards  improving  its 
governance structure, huge tasks remain especially for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Tajikistan. The key challenge is to enhance the credibility of political authorities, 
to improve public sector management and to create market incentives. China and 
other East Asian countries provide useful lessons of how to find mechanisms to tie 
politicians‟ hands and to raise their credibility. Creating strong and  capable public 
administrations  will  not  undermine  the  power  of  ruling  elites  but  enhance  the 
capabilities  of  implementing  market-oriented  policies.  Fostering  international 
cooperation  and  competition  may  serve  as  disciplining  devices  for  strong 
governments. Central Asian countries cannot rely on a strong external anchor such 
as the EU or NATO, but as in the case of China, they may seek WTO membership, 
or  may  assume  a  leading  role  in  OSCE  like  Kazakhstan  and,  last  but  not  least, 
expose domestic companies to competitive world market pressures.   26 
Furthermore,  through  an  economic  empowerment  of  local  governments,  local 
(public) enterprises can be developed and become crucial for an economic take-off 
process even before large-scale privatization is undertaken. In addition, it would be 
conceivable to create competition under a dual-track approach; e.g., by fostering the 
emergence of private businesses in sectors such as agriculture, retail trade, and light 
manufacturing, and strengthening the corporate-control structures of, and introducing 
hard budget constraints for, TVEs and SOEs following the Chinese model. At a later 
stage, industrial liberalization and privatization can further proceed.  
Finally, the main findings of the preceding considerations can be synthesized as 
follows: First, governance can be viewed as a dynamic process, and policymakers 
need to take care that policies match institutions et vice versa. Market-enhancing 
governance structures are subject to change over time; they require permanent fine 
tuning  and  adapting  institutions  as  well  as  policy  solutions  to  changing  social, 
economic, and political environments. 
Second,  the  capability  of  crafting  and  adopting  country-  and  time-specific 
institutional structures is as important to effective governance as the formulation of 
policies.  Which  institutions  are  suitable  depends  on  the  stage  of  economic  and 
political development as well as on persisting informal institutions. 
Third,  political  legitimacy  is  an  indispensable  prerequisite  for  an  emerging 
societal consensus in favor of distinct transition strategies. 
Fourth,  credibility,  an  independent,  but  accountable  administration,  and  social 
consensus favor the emergence of a strong but limited government that guarantees 
political stability and increased governance capacity. 
Fifth, a Western-style democracy is not a universal model of development or a 
precondition to economic transition; effective governance is independent of the form 
of government. 
Sixth, while the initiation of policy and institutional reform can be facilitated by 
discretionary  authority  of  policymakers  and  political  institutions  which  shield 
policymaking from the influences of vested interests, their consolidation presupposes 
stable  expectations  with  respect  to  the  new  institutional  matrix  underpinning  the 
market  system,  and  private  actors  must  be  confident  that  these  rules  cannot  be 
arbitrarily changed or violated by the government and its agents. 
Finally, these propositions would be reinforced through a shared-growth strategy, 
which provides people with public goods as well as real assets. Such wealth-sharing   27 
mechanisms can provide market-oriented incentives and reinforce people‟s loyalty 
vis-à-vis political authorities. Real assets may include granting private property rights 
to the population regarding the houses and apartments, in which they live, pieces of 
land,  which  they  could  cultivate,  as  well  as  free  education  and  health  care.  In 
addition, fostering labor-intensive manufacturing, public investment in infrastructure, 
and land reform may help people to exploit their assets more effectively. Eventually, 
a  shared-growth  strategy  can  help  to  credibly  signal  the  political  leadership‟s 
commitment to economic development. In combination with a dual-track approach, it 
may  help  to  create  win-win  situations,  i.e.  a  reform  without  losers.  This  would 
enhance  the  legitimacy  of  the  political  leadership,  reduce  potential  resistance  to 
reform as well as incentives to migrate. 
These  considerations  illustrate  again  that  a  universal  market-enhancing 
governance  structure does  not  exist.  But  the  ultimate objective  of  crafting flexible 
governance structures is the same in all countries, namely to establish strong but 
limited governments which are embedded in institutional structures that provide a 
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